



Computer Forensic Investigations

Computer Forensic Services, LLC

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Topics to be covered

Tools: Hardware and Software
Procedures for protecting electronic evidence

Acquiring Electronic Evidence
Evidence Analysis and Data Recovery

Computer Operating Systems



Computer Forensics Defined

- "Computer Forensics deals with the preservation, identification, extraction and documentation of computer evidence."*
- "Computer forensics has also been described as the autopsy of a computer hard disk drive because specialized software tools and techniques are required to analyze the various levels at which computer data is stored after the fact."*
- Recovering Information the naked eye can no longer see.

Computer Forensic Example

- Recovery of over 1000 E-Mails off of a hard drive.
- A year and half after the individual left the company.
- After the hard drive had been formatted
- After the machine was in use by another user for that year and a half
- "Best way to remove e-mail from a hard drive is to hit with a sledge hammer and throw it into a furnace." John Patzakis, President & Chief Legal Officer Guidance Software



Tools

The Hardware






More Equipment- The Image Master





Portable Equipment??





The Workhorse Unfolded





Now This is Portable!!





The AirLite Unfolded:







Tools


The Software

Some of the Software



The Norton Utilities® for Windows/DOS

Disk #2 - Emergency/ **Data Recovery**



SYMANTEC.

07-50-01164 109-125-17 2/94

1.44 MB Diskette



Encryption Linux **Boot** Disk

Disk 1/2


2075 NORTHEAST DIVISION

GRESHAM, OREGON 97030

PHONE: (503) 661-6912 WWW.FORENSICS-INTL.COM

New Technologies Inc. THE ULTIMATE IN COMPUTER FORENSICS







Procedures

Protecting Electronic Evidence





Some Questions to Ask

 Was the computer system instrumental in the offense, i.e., a hacker or harassment case?

 Is the computer being used to store evidence of a crime, i.e., drug dealer maintaining trafficking records?

Secure the Computer as Evidence

- Photograph and log room, position of computer and status of computer.
- If the computer is "OFF," Do Not Turn "ON."
- If the computer is "ON," Do Not Turn "OFF."
- Huh??
- Place Evidence tape over each drive slot
- Photograph and label back of computer components while they are plugged in.
- Label all connection ends to allow reassembly if needed
- If transporting, treat all components as fragile
- Collect all devices such as cables, keyboards and monitors
- Collect instruction manuals, documentation, and notes
- User notes may contain passwords

Prepare Evidence and Chain of Custody Forms

Evidence Form

- Log make, model, and serial numbers
- Copy stays with evidence at all times
- Chain of Custody
 - Who, What, Where, When, Why, How
 - Copy stays with evidence at all times



Acquiring Electronic Evidence

The Hard Drive

- Forensic Image of the hard drive means to take an exact copy of a hard drive including deleted files and areas of the hard drive that a normal backup would not copy.
- Never boot off of the hard drive
- Use write protection software to protect the original evidence.
- Make a copy of the original evidence and do all work off of the copy
- Document all aspects of the hard drive.
- Tag and store original evidence
- Best evidence is original evidence.



Evidence Analysis and Recovery

Where Should One Begin?

Analysis Areas

- Email
- Temp Files
- Recycle Bin
- Info File Fragments
- Recent Link Files
- Spool (printed) files
- Internet History (index.dat)
- Registry
- Unallocated Space- free space on the hard drive
- File Slack- free space between the end of the logical file and the end of physical file (cluster)
- RAM Slack- free space between the end of the logical file and the end of the containing sector
 - Sector- the smallest group that can be accessed on the disk. A group of disk sectors as assigned by the operating system are known as clusters.



What's the Difference?





Here's the difference

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What Does It Take to Do Forensics?



Hardware

- Become familiar with the inside of the computer
- Understand hard drives and their settings
- Motherboards
- Power connections
- Memory

Knowledge of Operating Systems and Software

- Operating Systems
 - Microsoft Products
 - Linux RedHat
 - UNIX
- Software
 - Forensic Software
 - HTML
 - Microsoft Office
 - Quick View Plus
- "Jack of All Trades"

Training

- New Technologies (NTI) in Gresham, Oregon
- Guidance Software (Encase)
- Access Data
- HTCIA Annual Conference
 - HTCIA 2002 October 1st 3rd in Atlantic City, NJ



 One needs the ability to be able to sit in front of the computer and analyze the data for what could be an extensive amount of time.

 "No such thing as point and click forensics."

Contacts in the Industry

HTCIA

ListServes

- Computer Forensic Investigative Digest (CFID)
 - www.infobin.org
- High Tech Crime Consortium (HTCC)
 - www.hightechcrimecops.org

Forensic Case in the News

BUSINESS

The Company of Spies

The FBI busts a small firm for funneling technology to China—but it wasn't about bombs

By MASSIMO CALABRESI

UCLEAR WARHEADS. THAT'S WHAT comes to mind when the words China and espionage are put together. But a less geo-strategic although perhaps more pervasive form of Chinese spying returned to the headlines last week-one focused not on ideology but on gutsy entrepreneurship and pure capitalism. No nukes this time. Instead, the target was technology for an advanced consumer-phone system Arrested in the incident were a trio of business partners, all Chinese immigrants, including two employed by New Jersey-based Lucent Technologies. They had dreamed of an American shortcut to their country's capitalist road. In an e-mail pitch to Beijing venture capitalists, one of the accused said their company would become "the Cisco of China."

It was Lucent, however, and not Cisco that suffered the alleged theft in a case emblematic of a fresh direction in spying. Private companies and individuals were behind more than half the incidents of industrial espionage in 1999, the most recent year for which statistics are available from the National Counterintelligence Center. Chinese commercial spies—not neetsarily working for their government—have joined a throng of other agents targeting American know-how, including those from such ostensible U.S. allies as Japan, Israel, France and South Korea.

Two of the Lucent suspects left China to seek academic and monetary success in America, part of an influx of foreign-born scientists and engineers who helped propel the U.S. to R-and-D. dominance in the 1980s and '90s. Hai Lin, 30, got a Ph.D. from the New Jersey Institute for Technology in 1996, while his future colleague at Lucent, Kai Xu, 33, got a doctorlet in 1995 from Rutgers. Both found work through a technology-employment firm that places talented technicians with to investigators, the combination of Lin and Xu's insider knowledge of Lucent and Cheng's salesmanship led to the development of a business plan: take the source code for the PathStar Server, build a company around it and market it in China. In July 2000, Cheng traveled to Beijing to meet with the Datang company, an octopus of a communications conglomerate officially owned by the government but, like most such firms, charting its own chaotic routes to riches. Cheng secured at least \$1.2 million from Datang for a joint venture dubbed DTNET. Not bad for a little company launched in his New Jersey home and now impressively called ComTriad Technologies Inc.

But Lucent grew suspicious of Lin and Xu's activities and last February contacted the FBI and the U.S. Attorney's office in Newark, N.L. which began tracking the Internet exchanges of the two scientists. Without signs of independent product development at ComTriad, investigators nevertheless found e-mails allegedly showing the partners' listing "intellectual assets" identical to those of PathStar and discussing product pre-

sentations "based on PathStar." And unfortunately for Lucent, the e-mails show that by the time the feds were on the case, the PathStar source code was in Datang's hands. It will be harder to recover than a U.S. spy plane in Hainan--if not impossible. Investigators say there is no indication of any criminal act by Datang and the Chinese government, nor any indication that Beijing and its conglomerate knew their joint-venture partner Com-Triad was acting illegally.

Like many American companies, Lucent has invested millions in (and signed lucrative contracts with) Chinese companies. The incident is unlikely to dampen the company's ardor-or that of any other U.S. firm-for the promise of China capitalism. But the bottom line isn't likely to be profitable for three Chinese partners in America. The men are to be charged with wire fraud. Each faces five years in jail and \$250,000 in fines. Cheng is a naturalized American: Lin and Xu were only months away from their green cards. Hoping to be the Cisco of China, they may have forfeited the right to make it in America -With reporting by Desa Philadelphia/New York

vas given a tour of a re

E ON IN China's Pre

companies that need their expertise. For

two years they worked as "distinguished

members" of Lucent's staff, making six-

figure salaries and settling into comfort-

able lives in suburban New Jersey. It is

not clear when the two made contact with

the third suspect, Yong-Qing Cheng, a

vice president at the New Jersey-based IT

company Village Networks. But according





"That's All Folks!"

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